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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
and Jennifer A. Blackburn*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The difficult economic times and resulting budget cuts to many state
agencies were evident in the reduced number of high-level administrative law cases brought before the courts during this survey period. It
seems in tough times such litigation is often not pursued to the degree
it is in a more comfortable economic climate. As the economy begins to
recover, we will likely see an increase in the number and complexity of
administrative law cases brought before the appellate courts.
This Article is a survey of cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2010 through May 31, 2011.1
The cases included in this Article were selected based on the concentration of administrative law principles in the opinions. One will be able
to find specialized subject matters-some including administrative law
principles-in other articles in this volume.
This Article begins with a discussion of judicial review of administrative decisions and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Next, the
cases distinguish between discretionary and direct appeals. The Article
then addresses statutory construction, procedures regarding administrative rules, and sovereign immunity. The last section provides an

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., with honors, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.A., 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The Authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Troutman Sanders summer
associate (and soon to be associate) Nick Phillips in the preparation of this Article.
1. For analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn,Administrative Law,Annual Surveyof Georgia
Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2010).
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enumeration of legislation adding, subtracting, and dividing administrative agencies as passed during the 2011 regular session of the Georgia
General Assembly.
II.

JuDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY DECISION

This section addresses the judicial review of an administrative decision
and focuses on the well-established "any evidence" rule, which requires
the reviewing court to "defer to the agency's judgment regarding the
weight of the evidence and affirm the [agency's] findings if supported by
any evidence."' An exception exists where the agency's decision is
determined to be arbitrary and capricious.' However, as the Georgia
Court of Appeals recognized in Professional Standards Commission v.
Adams,' this exception has very limited application.' The superior
court is required to defer to an agency decision where it is supported by
any evidence and may "not substitute its [own] judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."' Only
where the agency determination is arbitrary and capricious may the
court revoke or modify that decision.' To be arbitrary and capricious
the determination must lack a rational basis.'
In Adams, the superior court affirmed the agency's determination that
a principal violated Standard 10 of the Code of Ethics for Educators'
but reversed the revocation of her educator's certificate, finding the
agency had arbitrarily and capriciously revoked the principal's certificate
out of retaliation over her appeal."o However, the court of appeals held
that no evidence in the record supported such a finding." Instead, the
record demonstrated that, following the administrative law judge's
hearing, the agency rationally determined the principal's conduct was far
more severe than it had originally believed. 2 The principal's conduct
justified an increased sanction, which is permitted under Georgia law."a

2. Profl Standards Comm'n v. Adams, 306 Ga. App. 343, 346, 702 S.E.2d 675, 678
(2010) (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Hogan, 298 Ga. App. 454, 454, 680
S.E.2d 518, 520 (2009)).
3. Id.
4. 306 Ga. App. 343, 702 S.E.2d 675 (2010).
5. See id. at 346, 702 S.E.2d at 678.
6. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2009).
7. Adams, 306 Ga. App. at 346, 702 S.E.2d at 678.
8. Id.
9.

GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 505-6-.01(3)(j) (2009).

10. 306 Ga. App. at 345-46, 702 S.E.2d at 678.
11. Id. at 347-48, 702 S.E.2d at 679.
12. Id. at 346-47, 702 S.E.2d at 678-79.
13. Id.
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Because there was evidence in the record to support the agency's
determination and a rational basis for the sanction imposed, the superior
court exceeded its authority in overturning the agency's decision and the
order was reversed. 14
In City of Atlanta v. Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc.,'" the
superior court applied the proper standard of review but erred in its
The board of zoning adjustment
application of that standard."
affirmed the city's revocation of Starship Enterprises' building permit,
finding the nonconforming use as an adult business had been interrupted by a permitted use as a used furniture store and therefore could not
be resumed. The superior court reversed the board's decision and
ordered that the building permit be reinstated. 17
While the superior court recognized the any evidence standard as the
proper standard of review, the court incorrectly applied the standard by
determining that the board presented "'no evidence at all' in support of
its finding of an intervening use."" The record contained testimony
from residents regarding the removal of old signs, installation of new
signs, and "what appeared to be commerce going on at that location" for
approximately six months." Such testimony clearly satisfied the any
evidence standard, and the court of appeals reversed the superior court's
judgment.2 0
Surprisingly, in the next case, the court of appeals was required to
clarify the common understanding that the any evidence rule only
applies to cases "involv[ing] rules or regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies or entities performing non-profit governmental
functions . . . ."

In Savannah Cemetery Group, Inc. v. DePue-Wilbert

Vault Co.,22 the cemetery group argued that, since evidence was
presented at trial to show that a rule the group implemented was
reasonable, the superior court was required to uphold such rule
prohibiting the use of concrete burial vaults in its cemeteries.2 3
However, the cemetery group's reliance on the any evidence rule was

14. Id. at 348, 702 S.E.2d at 679.
15. 308 Ga. App. 700, 708 S.E.2d 538 (2011).
16. Id. at 701, 708 S.E.2d at 539.
17. Id. at 700-01, 708 S.E.2d at 538.
18. Id. at 701, 708 S.E.2d at 539.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 702, 708 S.E.2d at 539.
21. Savannah Cemetery Grp., Inc. v. DePue-Wilbert Vault Co., 307 Ga. App. 206, 209,
704 S.E.2d 858, 864 (2010).
22. 307 Ga. App. 206, 704 S.E.2d 858 (2010).
23. Id. at 209, 704 S.E.2d at 863.
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misplaced since it was a private, for-profit business." Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that "the cemetery group's rule was not entitled to
the deference afforded a rule promulgated by administrative agencies or
governmental entities.""
In the next case, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that, under
section 50-13-19(h) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A. ),26 the superior court does not have the power to enjoin an agency
from exercising its discretion and is instead limited to reviewing the
In Scarborough v.
action after the agency exercises its discretion.
Hunter," the superior court issued a temporary restraining order
preventing the board of commissioners from holding a hearing or taking
a vote on the abandonment of a public road." Georgia law provides
counties with the discretion to abandon former public roads when such
abandonment is in the best interest of the public."o Because the county
did not have the necessary funds to maintain the road, the board
determined that abandonment was in the county's best interest.3 1
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) provides that "Itihe court shall not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings."32 The statute clearly does
not give the superior court power to enjoin an agency's discretion.
Instead, it indicates that the superior court's duty is to review the
agency's decision "after [it] exercises its discretion, not prevent the
[agency] from using its discretion at all."34 Because the superior court
"put the cart before the horse" in granting the temporary restraining
order, the judgment was reversed.
III.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The next case also analyzes O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19,36 but with the focus
on standing to seek judicial review of an agency decision. In Fulton

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 209-10, 704 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 210, 704 S.E.2d at 864.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2009).
Scarborough v. Hunter, 288 Ga. 687, 689, 706 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).
288 Ga. 687, 706 S.E.2d 650 (2011).
Id. at 688, 706 S.E.2d at 651.
See O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
Scarborough, 288 Ga. at 688-89, 706 S.E.2d at 651.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h).
Scarborough, 288 Ga. at 689, 706 S.E.2d at 652.
Id.
Id. at 690, 706 S.E.2d at 652.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2009).
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County Taxpayers Foundation,Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission," the Fulton County Taxpayers Foundation (Foundation) asserted
that the superior court improperly determined that the Foundation
lacked standing to seek judicial review of a Public Service Commission
(PSC) certification order." Under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a), two requirements must be met to seek judicial review of an agency decision: (1) "a
person must have exhausted all administrative remedies available
within the agency and [(2) the person] [must be] aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case . . . .""
While the Foundation was aggrieved by the PSC's certification order
because their status as Georgia Power customers would be impacted by
an increase in the utility rate, the superior court determined they had
not exhausted all administrative remedies available to them through the
PSC.40 The Foundation should have applied for "intervention status in
the proceedings conducted by the PSC on Georgia Power's application for
certification within 30 days following the first published notice of the
proceeding."' Although the Foundation sought to intervene, they did
not do so until eight months after notice of the proceeding was published." Because the Foundation failed to "file a timely application to
intervene, they [did] not satisflyl the first requirement of [O.C.G.A.]
§ 50-13-19(a)" and therefore lacked standing to seek judicial review. 3
Timely filing was also an issue in Hall County Board of Tax Assessors
v. Avalon Hills Partners,LLC,44 where the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that Avalon Hills Partners, LLC (LLC) did not file a timely appeal
with the Board of Equalization, as required under O.C.G.A. § 48-5311,45 and thus failed to exhaust its administrative remedies." The
LLC attempted to appeal their 2009 tax assessments by submitting
letters to the Board requesting reduced assessments prior to receiving
actual notice of the 2009 tax assessments. The Board assessment
notices clearly stated that the property owner had the right to file an
appeal with the Board of Equalization by written notice within thirty

37. 287 Ga. 876, 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010).
38. Id. at 878, 700 S.E.2d at 556.
39. Fulton Cnty. Taxpayers Found., Inc., 287 Ga. at 878, 700 S.E.2d at 556 (second
alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a).
40. Fulton Cnty. Taxpayers Found., Inc., 287 Ga. at 878, 700 S.E.2d at 556.
41. Id. at 879, 700 S.E.2d at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 46-259(c) (2004).
42. Fulton Cnty. Taxpayers Found., Inc., 287 Ga. at 879, 700 S.E.2d at 557.
43. Id. at 880, 700 S.E.2d at 557.
44. 307 Ga. App. 520, 705 S.E.2d 674 (2010).
45. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 (2010).
46. Avalon Hills, 307 Ga. App. at 520-21, 705 S.E.2d at 674-75.
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days of notice or the right to appeal would be lost. The LLC never
Despite this failure to provide proper
provided such written notice.
notice, the LLC was granted a hearing before the Board of Equalization
where it was decided there would be "No Change" to the 2009 valuations.4 8 The LLC then appealed to the superior court arguing that the
letters submitted before the assessment notices were mailed should
nonetheless serve as substitutes for the statutory notice requirement."
On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals determined that "the
failure to file timely a notice of appeal extinguished the taxpayers' right
to appeal, even though the taxpayers had indicated disagreement with
valuations before receiving the formal notices of assessment.""o Much
like the facts of this case, in Peagler v. Georgetown Associates,"
taxpayers submitted a written request to discuss the proposed valuations
of their properties prior to the issuance of the formal notices of
assessment from the Board of Tax Assessors. The taxpayers then failed
to file a timely appeal from such notices of assessment once they were
received.52 The Georgia Supreme Court determined that the taxpayers'
prior communication did not excuse them from complying with the
statutory requirements for filing a notice of appeal from the formal
notice of assessment issued by the Board of Tax Assessors.
Similarly, in Avalon Hills, the letters submitted before the assessment
notices were mailed did not excuse the LLC from complying with the
statutory requirement that a taxpayer mail or file a notice of appeal
within thirty days." As such, the court of appeals held that the LLC
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that the superior court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the appeal."
IV. DISCRETIONARY VERSUS DIRECT APPEALS
This section compares discretionary and direct appeals and determinations of when each is required. The first case, Worley v. Peachtree
City," involved both a zoning action, which is the review of an agency
decision and therefore requires a discretionary appeal, and an annex-

47. Id. at 521, 705 S.E.2d at 675.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 523, 705 S.E.2d at 676.
50. Id. at 524, 705 S.E.2d at 677 (citing Peagler v. Georgetown Assocs., 232 Ga. 848,
848, 209 S.E.2d 186, 186 (1974)).
51.

232 Ga. 848, 209 S.E.2d 186 (1974).

52.

Id. at 848, 209 S.E.2d at 186.

53.

Id.

54. 307 Ga. App. at 524, 705 S.E.2d at 677.
55. Id. at 520-21, 705 S.E.2d at 675.
56.

305 Ga. App. 118, 699 S.E.2d 94 (2010).
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ation challenge, which is routinely heard on direct appeal. In its motion
to dismiss, the city argued that the zoning action could only be heard by
discretionary appeal.
Where "the underlying subject matter of an appeal involves claims
with independent standing, one of which is subject to the discretionary
appeal statute and one of which is directly appealable, a party may file
a direct appeal and the appellate courts have jurisdiction to address both
Because Worley's claim involved an annexation claim in
claims."'
addition to the zoning challenge, the annexation claim had independent
standing for the direct appeal. 9 Accordingly, jurisdiction was established and the city's motion to dismiss was denied.o
In Fulton County v. T-Mobile South, LLC," T-Mobile asserted that
the county's denial of a tax refund request constituted an administrative
decision; thus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35,62 the court lacked
jurisdiction because the county did not file a discretionary appeal.6 "
The intent of the statute is to give the appellate courts the discretion as
to whether or not to entertain an appeal where the superior court has
already reviewed the decision of an administrative agency.64 Here
there was no decision by an administrative agency for the superior court
to review. Instead, the county attorney simply denied T-Mobile's
requested refund of the 9-1-1 charges the county collected.6 ' Because
the county's action did not constitute an agency decision, the county was
not required to file a discretionary appeal and T-Mobile's motion to
dismiss was denied.66
The application of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 was further clarified in Danbert
v. North Georgia Land Ventures, LLC." North Georgia Land Ventures
argued that the "Danberts' direct appeal should be dismissed for failure
to follow the [statutory] discretionary appeal procedure" because the
underlying issue was "the trial court's review of the [clounty's administrative decision to approve the subdivision application."' However, the

57. Id. at 119-20, 699 S.E.2d at 96.
58. Id. at 120, 699 S.E.2d at 96.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 119-20, 699 S.E.2d at 96.
61. 305 Ga. App. 466, 699 S.E.2d 802 (2010).
62. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995 & Supp. 2011).
63. 305 Ga. App. at 468, 699 S.E.2d at 805; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(axl), (b).
64. T-Mobile South, 305 Ga. App. at 468,699 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Ladzinske v. Allen,
280 Ga. 264, 626 S.E.2d 83, 85 (2006)).
65. Id. at 468-69, 699 S.E.2d at 805-06.
66. Id. at 469, 699 S.E.2d at 806.
67. 287 Ga. 495, 697 S.E.2d 204 (2010).
68. Id. at 495 n.3, 697 S.E.2d at 205 n.3.
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county's subdivision regulations provided a specific review procedure for
such applications." The Georgia Supreme Court held that where the
underlying local ordinance provides a specific remedy, such remedy
supersedes the discretionary appeal procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. § 56-35.'0
V.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

At times, an agency's construction of the governing statute that the
agency is charged with administering becomes the central issue in a
case. ChoicePoint Services, Inc. v. Graham" provided a good example
of this situation. Georgia law allows certain companies to obtain refunds
for sales tax paid on purchases of computer equipment that are greater
than $15 million.72 ChoicePoint made computer purchases exceeding
the threshold, but part of the purchases included electronically-delivered
computer software not subject to sales taxes. Upon ChoicePoint's filing
for sales tax refunds, the Department of Revenue denied the claim. The
Department of Revenue reasoned that because part of the purchases was
not subject to sales tax, and without such part ChoicePoint had not
reached the $15 million threshold, no refund was due. ChoicePoint
appealed to the superior court but was unsuccessful." The basis for
the superior court's ruling was that "the exemption statute applied only
to sales of tangible equipment because only such sales were taxable."74
ChoicePoint subsequently filed an application for discretionary appeal
that was accepted by the Georgia Court of Appeals.
ChoicePoint's primary argument was that the statute was plain on its
face and there was no limitation contained in the definition of "computer
equipment" that required purchases to be tangible equipment subject to
the sales tax." The Department of Revenue presented three unsuccessful arguments in reply. First, it argued that a related statute gave a

definition of "sale" that was confined to tangible personal property.77
The court of appeals was not persuaded, as a more specific definition
was present in the contested statute." Second, the Department of
69. Id.
70. See id.
71.
72.
2011).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

305 Ga. App. 254, 699 S.E.2d 452 (2010).
Id. at 254, 699 S.E.2d at 454; see also O.C.G.A.
305 Ga. App. at 254-55, 699 S.E.2d at 453-54.
Id. at 255, 699 S.E.2d at 454.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256, 699 S.E.2d at 455.
Id.

§ 48-8-3

(68)(A) (2009 & Supp.

2011]1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

55

Revenue contended that the statute under review did require that tax
be collected before a sale could be used to qualify for the granted
exemption." The court found no such requirement anywhere in the
statutory language."o Finally, the Department of Revenue relied upon
its promulgated rules and regulations.8 ' The court viewed this merely
as bootstrapping because the regulation could not exceed the scope of the
statute itself.8 2
In reversing the superior court, the court of appeals relied upon the
plain language of the statute. 3 It determined that the language was
clear and would not allow deference to the agency determination because
to do so would ignore such a primary interpretive rule.&
Judicial Council of Georgia v. Brown & Gallo, LLC" was a somewhat unique case, in that it involved a rule of a judicial branch agency
rather than often-litigated decisions of executive branch agencies.'
Brown & Gallo is a court-reporting business that comes under the
administrative ambit of the Board of Court Reporting (Board), part of
the Judicial Council of Georgia (Council). Brown & Gallo sought a
declaratory judgment in superior court to overturn a rule that had been
Both
promulgated by the Board and reviewed by the Council.8
immunity
citing
sovereign
action,
defendants moved to dismiss the
enjoyed by the judiciary and also citing a specific exception in the
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (GAPA)" for the judiciary under
8
The superior court would not dismiss the
the definition of "agency."
action on either ground, separating an agency of the judiciary from the
judiciary itself under both arguments. 0 The court of appeals affirmed
the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the Georgia Supreme Court
granted review through a petition for a writ of certiorari."
The supreme court styled the primary question in the case as whether
the Board and the Council-as agencies of the judiciary and not actually
judges-were contained within the definition of the judiciary under the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 257, 699 S.E.2d at 455.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258, 699 S.E.2d at 456.
Id.
Id.
288 Ga. 294, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010).
Id. at 294-95, 702 S.E.2d at 896.
Id.
O.C.G.A. tit. 50, ch. 13. (2009 & Supp. 2011).
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1) (defining "agency" as not including the judiciary).
Brown & Gallo, 288 Ga. at 295-96, 702 S.E.2d at 896.
Id. at 296, 702 S.E.2d at 896-97.
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GAPA.9 2 The court recited certain GAPA provisions and stated that the
legislative intent that could be discerned did not point to a definitive
Instead, the decision relied largely upon separation of
answer.9 3
powers.?4 In reversing both the superior court and the court of appeals,
the following succinctly describes the gist of the opinion:
Because constitutional separation of powers prohibits the legislative
branch from encroaching upon the inherent powers of the judicial
branch of government, and because the Council and the Board are
agencies of the judiciary which are imbued with responsibilities that
are important to the administration of justice belonging naturally and
logically to the judicial branch concerning the practice of a profession
of officers of the courts, we construe "the judiciary" in [O.C.G.A. § 5013-2(1)] to include the Council and the Board."
The gold star for the most unusual reported case during the survey
period has to go to Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office." Grimes
sought the expungement of a criminal record in a case in which he had
been indicted, but which was later nolle prossed. The request went to
the sheriff's office, where the record was apparently located, and the
sheriff sent it to the district attorney. The district attorney objected to
the proposed action, and Grimes was so informed. Grimes appealed the
sheriff's denial to superior court. The district attorney requested that
the appeal be dismissed because of the prior issuance of the indictment,
and the superior court granted the motion. An appeal by Grimes
ensued.97
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the procedures dictated
under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)" had not been followed." Even though
he had previously been indicted, Grimes was entitled to have the appeal
heard by the superior court for a finding as to whether any of the
statutory reasons barring expungement were present.'00 Because it
did not do so, the case was remanded to the superior court for the
prerequisite determination. 0 '

92. Id. at 296, 702 S.E.2d at 897.
93. See id. at 297, 702 S.E.2d at 897.
94. See id. at 297-98, 702 S.E.2d at 897-98.
95. Id. at 298, 702 S.E.2d. at 898.
96. 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010).
97. Id. at 481-82, 705 S.E.2d at 672-73. Interestingly, the expungement process
originates from O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d) (2006), although the GAPA is broadly utilized. See,
e.g., Grimes, 307 Ga. App. at 484, 705 S.E.2d at 673.
98. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d) (2006).
99. Grimes, 307 Ga. App. at 482-83, 705 S.E.2d at 672-73.
100. Id. at 484, 705 S.E.2d at 673.
101. Id.
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The last case in this section concludes several years of court actions
concerning how hotel occupancy taxes should be handled by online travel
companies."o2 City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com'03 raised the question of
whether a negotiated wholesale rate between an online travel company
(OTC) and a hotel should be the basis for payment of a hotel occupancy
tax or whether the room rate actually paid by the consumer to the online
travel company was the correct amount. The City of Atlanta brought an
action against Hotels.com, pleading that the retail room rate was the
correct amount for computing the hotel occupancy tax and also seeking
back taxes from many OTCs. The trial court found in favor of the City
of Atlanta. It enjoined the OTC from acting in a manner inconsistent
with the court's order, instructing the OTCs to collect and remit taxes
based upon the room rate paid by the consumer. Both sides appealed,
with the City of Atlanta being listed as the appellant.o'
So far as the OTCs were concerned, the court interpreted that the
questioned ordinance of the City of Atlanta meant the following:
[Tihe amount that is taxable is the retail amount paid for occupancy
by someone who will occupy the room. Since the consumer cannot
obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate
charged by the OTC, it is the retail room rate that is the taxable
amount or "rent" under the City's ordinance. 0 5
In other words, whatever the OTC charged the consumer is the basis for
the tax.1 0 6 On that count, the trial court was affirmed.'
Ancillary
issues raised by the OTC were summarily rejected, as was an enumeration of error by the City of Atlanta.os Thus, the ordinance and its
application were upheld and the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed.0 0
VI.

PROCEDURES REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

The first case in this part is Lumsden v. Williams,'o and while it
was an action based in part upon the Repair Act,"' the interaction
with administrative law was based upon a motion to take judicial notice

102. See, e.g., Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 1, at 7-8.
103.

289 Ga. 323, 710 S.E.2d 766 (2011).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 323-25, 710 S.E.2d at 767-69.
Id. at 326, 710 S.E.2d at 769.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 326-28, 710 S.E.2d at 769-71.
Id. at 328, 710 S.E.2d at 771.
307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43 (2004 & Supp. 2011).
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of a rule. 1 12 The Lumsdens were purchasers of a home from Williams,
who had provided typical warranties and guaranties on the construction.
During the year following the sale of the home, certain problems
developed that necessitated an eventual court action."13
As a part of its duties, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA)
provides the state minimum standards for residential buildings like the
home that the Lumsdens purchased.114 The Lumsdens requested that
the court give judicial notice to Rule 110-11-1-.11115 as promulgated by
the DCA." 6 The rule relates to the minimum building code for
residences."' The trial court denied the Lumsdens' request, finding
that the DCA had adopted a rule outside of the authority granted to the
DCA by the General Assembly.'
The original authority for the
promulgation was O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(aXA)(i)-(ii),' which provided for
the adoption of the Council of American Building Officials One-and-TwoFamily Dwelling Code (CABO code).120 That enactment by the General
Assembly additionally allowed the DCA to adopt later additions or
amendments to the CABO code.121
The version of the regulations that applied at the time of the
construction on the home purchased by the Lumsdens was promulgated
in 2002 by the DCA. The trial court determined that this promulgation
was not a later addition of, or an amendment to, the earlier CABO
code. 12 2 Rather, the promulgation substituted the International
Residential Code for One-and-Two Family Dwellings (IRC)1'2 in place
of the CABO code. 12 4 Accordingly, the trial court found it was outside
of the authority granted to the promulgating agency. Using the prior
code for guidance, the trial court held in favor of Williams, the seller.
The Lumsdens appealed.'25

112. 307 Ga. App. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
113. Id. at 163-65, 704 S.E.2d at 460-61.
114. See O.C.G.A. tit. 8, ch. 2. (2004 & Supp. 2011).
115.

GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 110-11-1-.11 (2002).

116. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
117.

See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 110-11-1-.11.

118. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
119. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(9XA)(i)-(ii) (2004).
120. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 165-66, 704 S.E.2d at 461-62; see also Council of
American Building Officals One-and-Two-Family Dwelling Code (1989) [hereinafter CABO
code].
121. See O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(9)(AXi)-(ii); O.C.G.A. § 8-2-23 (2004 & Supp. 2011).
122. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 166, 704 S.E.2d at 462.
123.
IRC].
124.

INT'L RESIDENTIAL CODE FOR ONE-AND-TWO-FAMILY DWELLINGS (2002) [hereinafter
Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 166, 704 S.E.2d at 462.

125. Id. at 165-66, 704 S.E.2d at 461-62.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals framed the issue regarding the
regulatory provisions as "whether the IRC can be considered a later
edition of [the CABO code] and thus whether it could properly be
adopted by the DCA, or whether it represents a completely separate
code."126 The court determined that there were two things that
doomed the questioned promulgation: (1) the IRC document contained
in its preface a statement that it was a complete code and only took
shape after an IRC task force studied the code that had earlier been
developed by the Council of American Building Officials;127 and (2) the
General Assembly adopted the IRC document as a new code in 2004, 128
which it would not have needed to do if the document was just a later
Accordingly, the court of
version of the earlier promulgation.12 9
to give judicial notice to
refusing
court's
ruling
the
trial
upheld
appeals
the IRC document."o Because of other issues contained in the case,
the lower court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part."a'
The other case that raised questions about the validity of an adminis-

trative rule was Georgia Society of Ambulatory Surgical Centers v.
Georgia Department of Community Health.1 32 The Department of
Community Health (DCH) is empowered to issue a request for data from
healthcare providers falling under the certificate of need (CON)
requirements and also from those in certain provider categories that are
exempt from a CON.' 3 3 The survey DCH issued for completion by
ambulatory surgical centers was questioned by the trade association
known as the Georgia Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers (GSASC).
The GSASC brought an action in superior court for injunctive relief on
the basis that the information sought by the DCH was outside of the
statutory scope as enumerated in the enabling statute. The superior
court concluded that injunctive relief should be denied and found the law
broad enough to permit the request for the contested information. 134
On appeal, the court of appeals had very little difficulty determining
that the trial court's actions were erroneous. Stated succinctly, the
ruling was as follows: "We conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in the present case because its decision to deny interlocutory
injunctive relief to GSASC was based on the erroneous legal conclusion

126.

Id. at 166-67, 704 S.E.2d at 462.

127. See IRC, supra note 123, preface.
128. See O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(9)(B)(i) (2004).
129. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 167, 704 S.E.2d at 462-63.
130. Id. at 167, 704 S.E.2d at 463.
131. See id. at 167-72, 704 S.E.2d at 463-66.
132. 309 Ga. App. 31, 710 S.E.2d 183 (2011) [hereinafter GSASC].
133. Id. at 32, 710 S.E.2d at 185; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 31-6-40(c)(2)(B), -70(a) (2009).
134. GSASC, 309 Ga. App. at 31, 710 S.E.2d at 184-85.

60

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

that the Disputed Requests were statutorily authorized."'" The court
went on to review the actual statute from which the survey was taken
so that it could discern whether the rule was authorized by the statute
and whether it could be found by a trial court to be reasonable.'
Because the survey contained information in categories that were beyond
those in the enabling statute, the court of appeals held that the trial
court erred."3 7
Inexplicably, the DCH also sought to use its own administrative rules
and regulations as authority for the survey questions and informaBesides precedent, it is just plain common sense that a rule
tion.'
cannot surpass the scope of its enabling statute, and the court of appeals
readily set the DCH right on this issue."
A final argument made by the DCH was that the trade association
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The argument was premised
on the availability of an administrative hearing if one of the healthcare
providers failed to respond to the annual survey.14 0 While reinforcing
that exhaustion of administrative remedies continues to be the rule, the
court of appeals held that exhaustion in this particular case would have
been futile."' Drawing from Glynn County Board of Education v.
Lane,"' the court of appeals held that, in light of the expressed
position of the DCH and its commissioner, administrative proceedings
would basically have been held before the agency "on the question of its
own conduct."' 43 Thus, the added expense of another layer of litigation
would have been fruitless.14 4
VII.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Besides Judicial Council of Georgia v. Brown & Gallo, LLC., 4 s the
only other case during the survey period involving the sovereign
immunity of agencies was Upper Oconee Basin Water Authority v.
Jackson County.14 Several counties in northeast Georgia banded

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
261 Ga.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 33-34, 710 S.E.2d at 186.
See id. at 34-35, 710 S.E.2d at 186-87.
Id. at 37, 710 S.E.2d at 188.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
261 Ga. 544, 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991).
GSASC, 309 Ga. App. at 38, 710 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting Glynn Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
at 546, 407 S.E.2d at 756) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
288 Ga. 294, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010).
305 Ga. App. 409, 699 S.E.2d 605 (2010).
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together under a 1994 enactment (Act)14 1 to become the membership
of the Upper Oconee Basin Water Authority (Authority)."' The
member counties entered into an agreement in 1996 to further the
purpose of the Act-increase water supplies to the member counties-and
to complete the Bear Creek Reservoir project."' According to this
agreement, the water was divided among the members according to
"Entitlement Shares," which represented the percentage of the reservoir
output that would be piped to each of the counties.'" The actual
amount that could be withdrawn from the reservoir for a particular
county was "a quantity equal to the .

.

. approved Established Yield of

the Project multiplied by the Member County's Entitlement Share of the
Project." 5
Jackson County requested that the Authority go back and recalculate
the Established Yield because of record droughts in the immediate prior
years, which the county felt would reduce the numbers. Surprisingly,
the Authority said no. Jackson County brought an action in superior
court asking for a judgment that the Authority was in breach, an
injunction requiring the requested recalculation by prohibiting use of the
current Established Yield, and a declaration granting the recalculation
originally requested by the county because the current Established Yield
was incorrect.'52
The Authority pleaded sovereign immunity and pointed to the
enactment of the General Assembly specifically categorizing the
Authority as a political subdivision.'
However, Jackson County
obviously anticipated sovereign immunity as a defense and presented to
the trial court that the claim arose under an intergovernmental
agreement, which is essentially a contract among the member counties.'5 4 Thus, sovereign immunity regarding contracts was waived by
the Georgia Constitution"' and by general law.'
After the trial
court denied the Authority's motion to dismiss, an appeal ensued."7

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
at 5125.
154.

See Ga. H.R. Bill 1514, Reg. Sess.. 1994 Ga. Laws 5123.
Id. § 5(b).
Upper Oconee Basin Water Auth., 305 Ga. App. at 410, 699 S.E.2d at 606-07.
Id.
Id. at 410-11, 699 S.E.2d at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 411, 669 S.E.2d at 607.
Id. at 411-12, 669 S.E.2d at 607; see also Ga. H.R. Bill 1514 § 3, 1994 Ga. Laws
Upper Oconee Basin Water Auth., 305 Ga. App. at 412, 699 S.E.2d at 608.

155. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c).
156. Upper Oconee Basin Water Auth., 305 Ga. App. at 412, 699 S.E.2d at 608; see also
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-1(a) (2009).
157. Upper Oconee Basin Water Auth., 305 Ga. App. at 409, 669 S.E.2d at 606.
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Using the analysis described in the preceding paragraph, the Georgia
Court of Appeals stated that "the essence of the [clounty's claim is for
breach of the [algreement."ss In fact, the agreement itself had a
provision authorizing a member county to bring an action for enforceThe
Accordingly, there was no sovereign immunity.160
ment.'"
Authority presented additional reasons that the action should not
continue, including failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, failure to state properly a claim for declaratory relief, and
additional defenses regarding the breach of contract claims.' 6 ' At the
preliminary stage of the litigation from which the appeal was taken, the
court of appeals ruled that it could not use the record in the case thus
far as a reason to absolve the Authority from possible liability that could
be proven by Jackson County.162 Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's denial of the Authority's motion to dismiss."
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

VIII.

Likely owing to the change in administration from the statewide

elections of 2010, there was considerable activity at the 2011 regular
session of the General Assembly regarding administrative agencies.
While some changes were relatively minor, some were highly significant.
The more noteworthy ones include the following:
The Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia will be
1.
responsible for reimbursing counties for the expenses of habeas corpus
cases instead of the duty falling to the commissioner of administrative

services.164
2. The Georgia Agricultural Exposition Authority was transferred for
purposes of administration from the Department of Natural Resources
to the Department of Agriculture.16 In a real no-brainer, the Commissioner of Agriculture was added as an ex officio member of the authority.'66

158.

Id. at 412, 669 S.E.2d at 608.

159. Id. at 413, 669 S.E.2d at 608.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 413-14, 669 S.E.2d at 608-09.

162. Id. at 414, 699 S.E.2d at 609.
163. Id. at 415, 699 S.E.2d at 610.
164. Ga. S. Bill 193 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 477 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-14-53
(Supp. 2011)).
165. Ga. H.R. Bill 125 § 2, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 261 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 2-3-3
(Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A.

(Supp. 2011)).
166.

Id.

§

12-3-472 (2006) and redesignating as O.C.G.A.

§ 2-3-3
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3. The Georgia Public Defender Standards Council has undergone
changes to its membership and refinement of the duties of both the
council and its director.16 7
4. Members of local boards of education must now have terms that
are at least four years long, and those boards in counties with homestead
option sales and use taxes must have at least seven district board
members unless there has been a contrary local enactment. 6 8
5. In somewhat of a new division of territory, the State Board of
Education, the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,
and the Board of Technical and Adult Education will have a framework
for coordinating curriculum and standards for certain courses and the
credit to be given.'"
6. There is a new State Education Finance Study Commission to
analyze such things as education funding, student transportation,
teacher pay, and several other areas.17 0
7.
The Georgia Capitol Museum is no longer part of the office of the
Secretary of State.'" It has been transferred to the Board of Regents
of the University System of Georgia.172 Additionally, the Capitol Arts
Standards Commission has its membership increased by one to include
the Secretary of State."'
8. The State Medical Education Board is gone and its functions were
The
transferred to the Georgia Board for Physician Workforce.17

167. Ga. H.R. Bill 238, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 91 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 17, ch. 12 (Supp. 2011)) (amending scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 17, ch.
12 (Supp. 2011)).
168. Ga. S. Bill 79 §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 26 (codified atO.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-52
to -52.1 (Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A. § 20-2-52 (2009) and enacting O.C.G.A. § 20-252.1 (Supp. 2011)).
169. Ga. H.R. Bill 186 §§ 1-9, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 635 (codified in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 20, ch. 2 (Supp. 2011) (amending scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tit.
20, ch. 2 (2009), repealing O.C.G.A. § 20-2-161.1 (2009), and enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2159.1 to -159.5 (Supp. 2011)).
170. Ga. H.R. Bill 192 § 1, Reg. Sess. (to be codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-330 to -333.3)
(enacting O.C.G.A. H§20-2-330 to -333.3).
171. Ga. S. Bill 190 §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 617 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-340 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 20-3-40 (Supp. 2011) and repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 4513-60 to -62 (1997)).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 3 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 45-13-70 (Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A. § 45-1370 (2006)).
174. Ga. H.R. Bill 509, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 459 (codified in scattered sections of
the O.C.G.A.) (amending scattered sections of the O.C.G.A.).
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receiving board was also given the power to award loans and scholarships.17

9. There is now a State Veterinary Education Board that will grant
loans for education of veterinarians whose practice will include food
animal specialties. 7' The functions are dependent upon when or if
appropriations are made.'
10. The State Board of Technical and Adult Education will now be
known as the State Board of the Technical College System of Georgia. 78
11. There is now established an Office of College and Career
Transitions as a part of the Technical College System of Georgia. 7 1
12. The 2011 Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform for
Georgians has been created to study the current criminal justice
structure.18 0 Additionally, the General Assembly created the Special
Joint Committee on Georgia Criminal Justice Reform.'
13. The former Division of Public Health has been split from the
Department of Community Health and now will be known as the
Department of Public Health, complete with a board and a commissioner.'8 2 In the same enactment, the Hemophilia Advisory Board was
created and assigned to the Department of Community Health.8 3
14. There is now a Special Advisory Commission on Mandated Health
Insurance Benefits that will attempt to ascertain the costs of mandated
health benefits.' 84

175. Id. § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-3-512 (Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A. § 20-3512 (2009)).
176. Ga. H.R. Bill 60 § 2, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 333 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3518.1 to -518.7 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-518.1 to -518.7 (Supp. 2011)).
177. Id.
178. Ga. H.R. Bill 49, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 632 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-4-10
(Supp. 2011)) (amending scattered sections of the O.C.G.A.)).
179. Ga. S. Bill 161 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 421 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-4-37
(Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 20-4-37 (Supp. 2011)).
180. Ga. H.R. Bill 265 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 35 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 28-13-2
(Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 28-13-2 (Supp. 2011)).
181. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 28-13-3 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 28-13-3
(Supp. 2011)).
182. Ga. H.R. Bill 214 §§ 3-1 to -2, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 705 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 31-2A-1 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 31-2A-1 and amending scattered sections of
the O.C.G.A.).
183. Id. § 2-1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-1-12 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 31-1-12
(Supp. 2011)).
184. Ga. S. Bill 17, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 329 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-1-19 (Supp.
2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 33-1-19 (Supp. 2011)).
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15. The Department of Public Safety has reacquired its employees
that had previously been assigned to the Georgia Aviation Authority,
and the department will once more have administrative control over
such functions.18'

16. There is now a Martin Luther King, Jr. Advisory Council which
will, among other things, have the power to create a nonprofit corporation in furtherance of its purposes."
17. The powers currently residing in the Office of Planning and
Budget relative to the Georgia Council for the Arts are shifted over to
the Department of Economic Development."'

185. Ga. H.R. Bill 414 §§ 2, 4, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 409 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 65-4 (Supp. 2011) and O.C.G.A. § 35-2-140 (Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A. § 6-5-4 (2009)
and enacting O.C.G.A. § 35-2-140 (Supp. 2011)).
186. Ga. S. Bill 141, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 255 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-8-240
to -242 (Supp. 2011)) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 50-8-240 to -242 (Supp. 2011)).
187. Ga. H.R. Bill 264 § 4, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 514 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-1225 (Supp. 2011)) (amending O.C.G.A. § 50-12-25 (2009)).
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